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INTRODUCTION

“What’s in a name? that which we call a rose// By any other name
would smell as sweet.”1 The idea that a name is artificial and meaningless
seems enchanting with respect to Romeo and Juliet’s star-crossed
romance. However, in today’s complicated and evolving workforce,
where courts face the difficult challenge of differentiating employees from
independent contractors a name actually has particular force. While an
employer may use one label for a worker, it is the job of the courts to look
past the label and ensure a worker is properly classified. The classification
of a worker as an employee or independent contractor has significance for
both parties. If a worker is labeled as an employee, an employer must
provide statutorily required income among other benefits. Therefore, an
employer can avoid substantial costs by characterizing a worker as an
independent contractor. Currently there is no standardized test that
provides guidance to courts for distinguishing employees from
independent contractors. Rather different agencies and jurisdictions use
different tests. This variation leaves courts with the challenge of applying
the different factors of varying tests to aspects of a business’s policies and
procedures that will definitively classify a worker as an independent
contractor or an employer.
Today we have emerging new business models in which
classification of workers is critical to the success of the company’s model,
yet classifying workers in these new models poses a challenge because of
their non-traditional nature. California, a traditionally employee-friendly
state, is considering the classification issue of two rising on-demand
companies, Uber and Lyft. In March 2015, two district court judges in the
Northern District of California denied summary judgment to both
companies, leaving the question of whether drivers were employees or
independent contractors to a jury.2 Both courts applied the California right
to control test for determining if a worker is an employee or independent
1

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 2.
Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2015); O’Connor v. Uber
Techs., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
2
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contractor, which was developed in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of
Industrial Relations.3
The Ninth Circuit is no stranger to shaking up the independent
contractor business model. In 2014, it ruled in Alexander v. FedEx4 that
FedEx drivers were employees, despite the fact that FedEx labeled them
as independent contractors. Alexander also applied California’s right to
control test, and found that the underlying employment relationship
between FedEx and its drivers was clear and unambiguous because of
FedEx’s control over its drivers’ appearance, vehicles, work hours, and
means of delivering packages.5 However, the Uber and Lyft business
models, which attract workers based on the ability of the driver to achieve
flexibility in schedule and productivity, do not provide such an obvious
answer to the classification question. Up to this point, the Borello factors
have been applied to an economic model vastly different from the quickly
evolving on-demand economy.6 That means that, if a court were to use
the same test that found FedEx drivers were employees and applied it to
Uber and Lyft’s relationship with its drivers, they may also be found to be
employees. As an alternative, this Article considers the possibility that
Uber and Lyft drivers fall into a new category of employment, one that has
not been considered among the traditional work relationships. First, the
Article lays out the different tests various branches of state and federal
government use to classify workers. Next, the Article will focus on the
Ninth Circuit’s case law and outline the history of the employment
misclassification test formed in Borello and applied in Alexander. Then,
the Article will turn towards the employee misclassification cases in
California involving Uber and Lyft. The Article will contrast the ondemand business models analyzed in these cases with FedEx’s business
model. Finally, the Article will propose a new classification of workers
that will make room for emerging on-demand business models—the
square peg between two round holes.

3

1989).
4
5
6

S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Industrial Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal.
Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 990.
Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081.
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II. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYEE
MISCLASSIFICATION
A. Classifying Worker Status
a. Why Do Employers Misclassify?
Under a traditional understanding of employment, employees were
“individuals hired on a permanent or full-time basis or part-time basis with
an understanding of continuous employment”7 and independent
contractors were “individuals who lack[ed] a contract for long term
employment and whose minimum hours may vary at random.”8 However,
this traditional understanding has been complicated by the different factors
and balancing tests used by different government agencies and states to
determine if a worker is an independent contractor or an employee.9 The
complications arising from the numerous tests cause some employers to
misclassify their workers out of genuine error. However, many employers
intentionally misclassify because of the financial benefits they gain from
labeling workers as independent contractors.10 If an employer classifies a
worker as an employee, federal and state laws require employers to pay
that employee at least minimum wage and overtime; refrain from
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and other personal characteristics;
maintain safe and healthy workplaces; contribute toward payroll taxes that
go towards the employee’s unemployment insurance; provide Social
Security, Disability Insurance and Medicare; provide workers’
compensation insurance; and, in many employers’ cases, provide
healthcare.11 The laws that afford protections to a worker classified as an
employee place an expensive burden on the employer. By mislabeling and
classifying workers as independent contractors, employers can avoid the
expenses of having a traditional employee.
Another benefit employers receive from misclassifying workers as
independent contractors is escaping vicarious liability. Under that theory,
an employer is liable, for the negligent acts of its employee, as long as the
7 Karen R. Harned, Georgina M. Kryda & Elizabeth A. Milito, Creating A Workable
Legal Standard For Defining An Independent Contractor, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP &
L. 93, 95 (2010).
8 Id.
9 Id. at 99.
10 Ruth Burdick, Principles of Agency Permit the NLRB to Consider Additional
Factors of Entrepreneurial Independence and the Relative Dependence of Employees
When Determining Independent Contractor Status Under Section 2(3), 15 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 75, 76 (1997).
11 Seth D. Harris and Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for
Twenty-First-Century Work: “The Independent Worker”, in THE HAMILTON PROJECT, 7
(2015).
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acts were committed in the course and scope of the employment.12 If an
employer retains a worker as an independent contractor, however, the
employer cannot be held responsible.13
b. Common Law Test
Under the common law, an agency test is used to determine whether
an individual is classified as an employee or an independent contractor for
purpose of figuring out when an employer is vicariously liable for the
tortious acts of its agents.14 The Restatement (Second) of Agency,
balances these factors to determine the type of relationship that exists:
(1) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
(2) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
(3) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(4) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(5) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing
the work;
(6) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(7) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(8) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer;
(9) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation
of master and servant; and
(10) whether the principal is or is not in business.15

These factors are weighed and balanced against each other. It is not
necessary that each factor is met, and the main focus of the test is whether
an employer retains the right to control the manner and means by which
the product is accomplished.16
12

Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998).
Id.
14 Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Rethinking the Worker Classification Test: Employees,
Entrepreneurship, and Empowerment, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 67, 76 (2013).
15 Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 220 (2)(a)–(j) (1958). See also Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24.
16 Cmty. for Creative Non- Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989).
13
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c. The “ABC” Test
The “ABC” Test is used by many states to determine an employer’s
obligation to pay unemployment taxes.17 Under this test, to be considered
an independent contractor, a worker must meet three requirements: (a) the
worker is free from control or direction in the performance of the work;
(b) the work is done outside the usual course of the company’s business
and is done off the premises of the business; and (c) the worker is
customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or
business.18 This test is broad and results in most workers being classified
as employees.19 It creates a presumption of employment, which makes it
harder for employers to escape financial and legal obligations through
intentional classification.20
d. The IRS Test
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) created a twenty-factor test to
determine whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor for
purposes of withholding taxes.21 An employer is responsible for
withholding income taxes, withholding and paying Social Security and
Medicare taxes, and paying unemployment taxes on wages to employees.22
Employers do not pay these taxes for independent contractors, which is
another incentive to classify workers as such.23 The IRS grouped the
twenty-factors that determine the degree of control and independence an
employer holds over a worker into three categories: (1) Behavioral: Does
the company control or have the right to control what the worker does and
how the worker does his or her job?;24 (2) Financial: Are the business
17 Karen R. Harned, Georgina M. Kryda & Elizabeth A. Milito, Creating A Workable
Legal Standard For Defining An Independent Contractor, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP &
L. 93, 102 (2010).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Independent Contractor (Self-Employed) or Employee?, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE,http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Independent
-Contractor-Self-Employed-or-Employee (last updated Apr. 18, 2017).
22 Understanding Employment Taxes, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.
gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/understanding-employment-taxes
(last
updated Dec. 14, 2016).
23 Id.
24 Behavioral
Control, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/
businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/behavioral-control (last updated Oct. 4, 2016).
(1) Instructions: If the employer directs where, when, or how work is done, the worker is
likely an employee. This is similar to the right-of-control common law test; (2) Training:
If the employer provides training so that the worker performs in a particular manner and
with a particular result, the worker is likely an employee. This is especially true if the
training is provided at regular intervals; (3) Order or sequence: If the employer requires the
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aspects of the worker’s job controlled by the payer?;25 and (3) Type of
Relationship: Are there written contracts or employee type benefits?26
Will the relationship continue and is the work performed a key aspect of
worker to perform his tasks in a particular order or sequence, or retains the right to establish
a particular order or sequence, the worker is likely an employee; (4) Assistance: If the
employer hires, supervises, and pays assistants to aid the worker, the worker is likely an
employee; (5) Furnishing of tools and materials: If the employer provides the supplies,
materials, equipment, and other tools necessary to perform the work, the worker is an
employee dependent on his employer; (6) Oral or written reports: If the employer requires
the worker to submit reports at regular intervals, the worker is likely an employee; (7)
Payment: If the employer pays the worker by salary or by hour, week, or month, the worker
is likely an employee. If the worker is paid when he or she bills for services performed, or
is paid on commission, the worker is likely an independent contractor; (8) Doing work on
employer’s premises: If the employer requires the worker to perform his/her services on
the premises, where the employer can have control over the worker, the worker is likely an
employee; (9) Set hours of work: If the employer requires the worker to perform a set
number of work hours, sets the worker’s schedule, or retains approval rights over the
worker’s schedule, the worker is likely an employee. If the employer does not approve the
worker’s schedule, the worker is likely an independent contractor.; (10) Full time required:
If the employer requires the worker to work on a full-time basis, the worker is likely an
employee.; (11) Working for more than one firm at a time: If the employer does not allow
the worker to perform work for another firm so long as it is performing work for the
employer’s firm, the worker is likely an employee. However, a worker can be an employee
of multiple firms at the same time. (12) Making services available to the public: If the
employer does not allow the worker to perform his work for the public as a free service,
the worker is likely an employee.
25 Financial Control, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/
small-businesses-self-employed/financial-control (last updated Oct. 4, 2016). (13)
Significant monetary investment: If the worker must make a significant monetary
investment in order to perform his services, he is independent of the employer and is not
an employee. There is no set dollar limit that qualifies as a “significant investment”; it is
determined on a case-by-case basis.; (14) Payment of business and/or traveling expenses:
If the worker must expend money for business or business-related travel, and the employer
pays these expenses, the worker is likely an employee. In this case, the employer generally
has the ability to control the extent of the employee’s business or travel expenses.; (15)
Realization of profit or loss: If the worker does not have the opportunity to profit (or loss)
from his work, he is an employee. The employer is in the capacity of receiving the money
directly from the client and has the opportunity for profit or loss.
26 Type of Relationship, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/businesses
/small-businesses-self-employed/type-of-relationship (last updated Oct. 4, 2016). (16)
Services rendered personally: If the worker must perform the work personally, and cannot
delegate the tasks, he/she is an employee; (17) Integration: If the employer uses the worker
as part of the course of normal business operations, the worker is likely an employee. In
this case, the success of the business may be directly related to the success of the individual
employee; (18) Continuing relationship: If the employer and the worker have a
longstanding, continuing relationship, the worker is likely an employee. This includes
work that is done at recurring intervals or services performed by a worker who is “on call.”;
(19) Right to discharge: If the employer may fire or dismiss the worker, the worker is likely
an employee.; (20) Right to terminate: If the worker can terminate the work relationship
and not be liable for completion of a particular job or service, the worker is likely an
employee. If the worker remains liable for a job or service, he or she is an independent
contractor.
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the business?27 The IRS asserts that no single factor is dispositive of
classification, and that businesses must weigh all the factors in relation to
the relationship.
e. Economic Realities Test
Courts use the economic reality test to determine coverage and
compliance with the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.28 The economic realities test, like the common law
right to control test, takes into account the degree of control an employer
has over his or her employee, but it also considers the degree to which the
workers are economically dependent on the business.29 Under the
economic realities test, courts look at six factors:
(1) the degree of control exerted by the alleged employer over the
worker; (2) the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss; (3) the
worker’s investment in the business; (4) the permanence of the
working relationship; (5) the degree of skill required to perform
the work; and (6) the extent to which the work is an integral part
of the alleged employer’s business.30

Courts must look at the totality of the circumstances rather than one
single factor.31
B. A New Era of Employee Misclassification Cases
a. Shift to an “On Demand Economy”
A few years ago, no one knew about Uber32 or Lyft33 and few could
imagine technology that would allow for-profit ride sharing in a stranger’s
27

Pivateau, supra note 14, at 88–89.
See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
29 See Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1998).
30 Id.
31 See id.
32 “Uber Technologies, Inc. provides a smartphone application that connects drivers
with people who need a ride. The company’s application enables users to arrange and
schedule transportation and/or logistics services with third party providers. Uber
Technologies services customers in North, Central, and South Americas, as well as Europe,
the Middle East, Africa and the Asia Pacific . . . . [T]he company was founded in 2009 and
based in San Francisco, California.” Company Overview of Uber Technologies, Inc.,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (May 19, 2017, 11:54 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=144524848.
33 “Lyft Inc. helps commuters to share rides with friends, classmates, and coworkers
going the same way. It helps organizations to establish private and social networks for
ridesharing. The company focuses on college, university, and corporate communities . . . .
[T]he company was founded in 2007 and is based in San Francisco, California. Lyft Inc.
operates as a subsidiary of Enterprise Holdings, Inc.” Company Overview of Lyft Inc.,
28
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personal vehicle. Now, these platforms have become well-recognized
businesses that connect sellers and buyers of fast and cheap transportation.
Uber and Lyft’s business models revolve around smart-phone apps that
connect drivers offering rides to passengers who seek them.34 Customers
are able to pay through the app, rather than directly to the driver.35 The
passengers pay a mileage-based fee through credit cards that the
companies keep on file.36 Uber and Lyft take a percentage of the fee and
give the rest to the drivers.37 The passengers input their location and
destination, and the app informs the customer when the driver has
arrived.38 The app shows customers the route the driver takes, the
estimated time of arrival, and the identity of the driver.39 After the
transaction is complete, the passenger rates the driver.40 Central to Uber
and Lyft’s business model is the classification of drivers as independent
contractors, and itself as a technological platform to connect those drivers
with passengers.
These types of business models have given rise to the “on demand
economy,” which is “the economic activity created by technology
companies that fulfill consumer demand via the immediate provisioning
of goods and services.” 41 The theory behind this business model is that
access to goods and skills is more important than ownership of them.42 It
is creating a marketplace for efficient exchange: an entire economy is
being formed around the exchange of goods and services between
individuals instead of directly from business to consumer.43 “This new
class of on-demand companies relies on a large freelance workforce
instead of on a classic company workforce.” 44 Companies in the ondemand economy hire workers to perform the services the companies
offer. The on-demand economy is breaking down the traditional
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (May 19, 2017, 11:54 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/research/
stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=58995029.
34 Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U CHI L REV DIALOGUE 85, 86 (2015).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Rogers, supra note 34, at 97.
41 Mike Jaconi, The ‘On-Demand Economy’ Is Revolutionizing Consumer BehaviorHere’s How, BUSINESS INSIDER, (July 13, 2014, 4:52 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com
/the-on-demand-economy-2014-7.
42 Danielle Sacks, The Sharing Economy, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 18 2011),
http://www.fastcompany.com/1747551/ sharing-economy.
43 Irving Wladawasky-Berger, The Continuing Evolution of the On-Demand Economy,
THE CIO REPORT (July 24, 2015 12:25 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/07/24/thecontinuing-evolution-of-the-on-demand-economy/.
44 Id.
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employment structure in favor of jobs that are more flexible and
temporary.
b. A New Dilemma
Recently, two separate decisions in California district courts
involving wage and hour suits brought by drivers for Uber and Lyft, have
shaken the independent contractor business model the ride-sharing
companies rely on. Two judges denied Uber and Lyft’s motion for
summary judgment that would have classified the drivers as independent
contractors, and instead established a rebuttable presumption that the
drivers were employees because they performed services for the
company’s benefit.45 Both judges found that material facts remain
disputed, and in light of this, the on-demand car services will need to make
their cases to the juries as to why their drivers should not be classified as
employees under the California Labor Code.46
In both cases, the courts relied on the right to control test adopted in
the California Supreme Court case S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v.
Department of Industrial Relations.47 In addition, both courts relied on a
Ninth Circuit wage and hour case, Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package
Sys., in which FedEx drivers alleged that FedEx had misclassified its
drivers as independent contractors, which entitled the drivers to unpaid
wages and expenses.48 The court found that the California FedEx drivers
were misclassified as independent contractors under the California right to
control test.49 The Alexander decision seems to be a catalyst for lawsuits
against emerging on-demand companies Uber and Lyft, which similarly
rely on independent contractors for the success of their business.
However, Uber and Lyft’s relationships with their drivers are far more
complicated and inconclusive than FedEx’s relationship with its drivers.
c. California’s Employee Friendly Laws
California law provides employees with many benefits and
protections, while independent contractors are afforded almost none:50
Employees are generally entitled to, among other things, minimum
wage and overtime pay, meal and rest breaks, reimbursement for
work-related expenses, workers’ compensation, and employer
45 See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also Cotter
v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
46 Id.
47 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989).
48 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014).
49 Id.
50 Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1074.
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contributions to unemployment insurance. Employers are also
required under California Unemployment Insurance Code to
withhold and remit to the state their employees’ state income tax
payments.51

California provides employees with these protections to ensure that
employers do not exploit employees due to the inequality in bargaining
power.52 The California legislature does not provide the same protections
to independent contractors because their independent status presumably
affords them more bargaining power against companies.53 Independent
contractors can “take their services and equipment elsewhere when faced
with unfair or arbitrary treatment, or unfavorable working conditions.”54
Further, they often are working for more than one company at a time, and,
therefore, are not “dependent on a single employer in the same all-ornothing fashion as traditional employees who tend to work on a full-time
basis for an indefinite term.”55 Past decisions in California have
demonstrated that the statutory provisions aimed at employees should be
liberally construed in favor of protecting the employees and implementing
the legislature’s intent.56
d. The Borello Decision
In Borello, the California Supreme Court examined whether
agricultural laborers hired to harvest cucumbers under a written “sharefarmer” agreement were independent contractors exempt from workers’
compensation coverage under the California Labor Code.57 The deputy
labor commissioner issued a stop order against a grower for failure to
secure worker’s compensation coverage for laborers.58 The grower argued
that the workers were seasonal agricultural laborers that harvested
cucumbers working under a share-farmer agreement, meaning they were
tenant farmers who received a share of the profits.59 Therefore, the grower
argued that the farmers were only seasonal, temporary workers, and should
be considered independent contractors.60

51
52
53
54
55
56
57

1989).
58
59
60

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1075.
S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Industrial Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 400 (Cal.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 402.
Id.
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Following the common law’s vicarious liability tradition, the court
held that, “[t]he principal test of an employment relationship is whether
the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner
and means of accomplishing the result desired.” 61 The court noted that
the factor of control is often inapplicable to a variety of employment
relationships when applied in isolation.62 Therefore, the court concluded
that, although the right to control the work details is the most important
consideration, the court also “endorse[ed] several ‘secondary’ indicia of
the nature of a service relationship.”63 The court identified the right to
discharge at will without cause, as strong evidence in support of an
employment relationship.64 Further, the court identified additional factors,
which are all interrelated elements to finding an employment relationship,
rather than separate tests:
(1) whether the one performing the services is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business; (2) the kind of occupation, with reference
to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the
direction of the principal or by a specialist without supervision; (3)
The skill required in the particular occupation; (4) Whether the
principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and
the place of work for the person doing the work; (5) The length of
time for which the services are to be performed; (6) The method
of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (7) Whether or not
the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; and (8)
Whether or not the parties believe they are creating employeremployee relationship. 65

Ultimately, the court held that the share-farmers were employees and
were entitled to compensation coverage.66 The grower argued that the
share-farmers managed their own labor, shared in the profit or loss,
performed a job that required specific skill and judgment, and signed an
agreement in which they expressly agreed that the parties’ relationship was
principal-independent contractor.67 However, the court found that the
grower exercised “pervasive control over the operation as a whole.”68 The
grower owned and cultivated the land for his own account, made the
decision to grow cucumbers, supplied the materials and transportation, and

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id. at 404.
Id.
Borello, 769 P.2d at 404.
It should be noted that this factor is unique to California’s right to control test.
Borello, 769 P.2d at 404.
Id. at 410.
Id. at 407–10.
Id. at 408.
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controlled workers’ documentation for production and payment.69 The
court held that, “[a] business entity may not avoid its statutory obligations
by carving up its production process into minute steps, then asserting that
it lacks control over the exact means by which one such step is performed
by the responsible workers.”70 Under the test the court had adopted, the
grower maintained all necessary control over the process.71
e. The Alexander Decision
The Ninth Circuit reversed a ruling by the Multidistrict Litigation
Court, which granted summary judgment in favor of FedEx in a class
action alleging that FedEx drivers in California were employees rather
than independent contractors.72 Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that the
amount of control FedEx exhibited over its drivers weighed in favor of
finding an employment relationship.73 The court applied the right to
control test adopted in Borello.74 The Ninth Circuit found that “FedEx’s
policies and procedures unambiguously allow FedEx to exercise a great
deal of control over the manner in which its drivers do their jobs.”75 FedEx
maintained control through its detailed appearance requirements for the
drivers and their vehicles.76 FedEx also controlled the time its drivers can
work by adjusting workloads so that they were forced to work nine and a
half to eleven hours a day.77 The court found that FedEx controlled how
and when drivers delivered packages.78 The court rejected the crux of
FedEx’s argument, that it only controls the results of the work and that
there were details of the driver’s work it did not control.79 The court noted
that having absolute control is not necessary for workers to be considered
employees under the right to control test.80
The Court found that the secondary factors of the right to control test
did not sufficiently favor FedEx to permit it to classify its drivers as
independent contractors.81 First, the right to terminate at will is strong
evidence of employee status.82 Further, there were factors that weighed in
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id.
Id. at 404 (internal quotations omitted).
Borello, 769 P.2d at 401.
Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 983 (9th Cir. 2014).
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FedEx’s favor such as their operating agreement that contained an
and the provisions pertaining to tools and
arbitration clause,83
equipment.84 However, the court found that, even though plaintiffs
provided their own trucks and were not required to obtain equipment from
FedEx, the majority of the drivers did so.85 The final factor that favored
FedEx was the parties’ agreement that they were creating an independent
contractor relationship.86
The operating agreement identified the
relationship as an independent contractor; however the court found that
this factor was not dispositive or controlling if, as a matter of law, a
different type of employment relationship exists.87 “What matters is what
the contract, in actual effect, allows or requires.”88 After examining
FedEx’s policies and procedures, the court concluded that the drivers were
employees, rather than independent contractors.89
In this holding, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the
“entrepreneurial test” that had been adopted by the District of Columbia
Circuit for classifying employment status.90 Under the entrepreneurial
test, the emphasis is shifted away from control, and the primary factor is
whether the worker has significant opportunity for gain or loss.91 FedEx
relied on the D.C. Circuit decision to argue that the drivers had the
opportunity under the operating agreement to delegate to other drivers,
take on additional routes, or sell routes to third parties.92 However, the
court held that these entrepreneurial opportunities that FedEx provides
drivers are limited because FedEx ultimately has final control, for
example, FedEx may refuse to let a driver take on additional routes or sell
his route.93 The court held that, regardless, the entrepreneurial test had no
application to the case: “There is no indication that California has replaced
its longstanding right-to-control test with the new entrepreneurialopportunities test developed by the D.C. Circuit.”94
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III. NEW BUSINESS MODEL, SAME OLD TEST
The California right to control test, when applied to the facts in
Alexander, led the court to the conclusion that the workers were
employees. Though FedEx contracted with the drivers as independent
contractors, most aspects of FedEx’s relationship with its drivers looked
like a traditional employer/employee relationship.95 However, worker
relationships in emerging business models, such as Uber and Lyft, do not
neatly fit into the traditional independent contractor-employee dichotomy.
The Borello test has consistently been applied to result in either
independent contractor or employee status. In Cotter and O’Connor, both
judges recognize a new, unclassified relationship between worker and
company.
A. What is Control?: Disparities Between Alexander and Emerging OnDemand Cases
The court in Cotter examined whether Lyft drivers should be
considered employees or independent contractors under California law.96
The court denied cross-motions for summary judgment, and found that the
issue presented a mixed question of law and fact that should be resolved
by a jury.97 The court in O’Connor reviewed a similar matter involving
the classification of Uber drivers.98 The court denied defendant’s motion
for summary judgment, leaving a jury to resolve the matter.99 In
Alexander, even though FedEx cloaked its drivers as independent
contractors, the Ninth Circuit found that FedEx drivers were employees as
a matter of law because “the arrow pointed so strongly in the direction of
one status or another that no reasonable juror could have pointed the arrow
in an opposite direction after applying California’s multi-factor test.”100
The courts in both ride-share cases acknowledged that the Borello right to
control test does not produce such a conclusive result when applied to
Uber and Lyft drivers. The court in O’Connor noted that “numerous
factors point in opposing directions.”101 The court in Cotter recognized
that “[a]t first glance, Lyft drivers don’t seem much like employees . . . .
But Lyft drivers don’t seem much like independent contractors either.”102
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In Cotter, the parties disagreed about the amount of control Lyft
exercises over its drivers. The court acknowledged that Lyft maintains a
good deal of control over how drivers proceed after they accept ride
requests.103 Lyft provides a driver with instructions on what not to do on
the job.104 Also, Lyft reserves the right to penalize or terminate drivers
who violate company policy.105 Lyft maintains quality control over its
drivers through a rating system, and any driver who falls below a certain
threshold is subject to termination.106 However, the court also recognized
that the Lyft drivers “enjoy great flexibility in when and how often to
work—far more flexibility than the typical employee.”107 The court noted
that there was no overwhelming evidence of an employment relationship,
as in Alexander.108 The court further pointed out, “[t]he experience of the
Lyft driver is much different from the experience of the FedEx driver,
underscoring why the plaintiffs have not established here that summary
judgment should be granted in their favor.”109
In O’Connor, the court recognized that many factors of control were
disputed and ambiguous in Uber’s relationship with its drivers.110 First,
the court pointed out that there was a dispute over whether a driver can be
terminated at will.111 Plaintiffs claimed that Uber might fire drivers at any
time for any reason, which would be strong evidence of an employment
relationship.112 However, Uber pointed out that before it terminates
drivers it must give notice or there must be a material breach in the driver
agreement.113 Uber uses a customer rating system as a form of quality
control, similar to the rating system Lyft uses.114 The court pointed to
evidence that, if a driver’s star rating falls below the minimum star rating,
Uber terminates the driver.115 The court noted that the customer rating
system is a form of control used by Uber to “constantly monitor certain
aspects of a driver’s behavior,” and that a jury could find it weighs in favor
of finding an employment relationship.116 The court noted that the fact
that Uber has no control over its drivers’ hours and when they report for
103
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work significantly weighs in favor of independent contractor status.117
However, the court pointed out that “[t]he more relevant inquiry is how
much control Uber has over their drivers while they are on duty for
Uber.”118 The court in O’Connor noted that there were many factors of
the Borello test that pointed in different directions, including those
involving Uber’s level of control over the manner and means of
performance.119
B. Why Traditional Classifications Under Borello Do Not Work For
Uber And Lyft
The courts in O’Connor and Cotter were faced with the task of
applying traditional common law principles encompassed in the Borello
right to control test, to technological platforms that operate from a
smartphone. The independent contractor model of the emerging ondemand companies becomes the “Wild West”120 of classification: “The
test the California courts have developed over the 20th Century for
classifying workers isn’t very helpful in addressing this 21st Century
problem. Some factors point in one direction, some point in the other, and
some are ambiguous.”121 It is true that the factors of the Borello test can
sometimes produce different outcomes even when applied to many old
economy jobs, depending on how a court interprets the facts of the case or
weighs a specific factor. However, the business models of Uber and Lyft
do not look anything like old economy jobs. From an economic and
societal perspective, the technology Uber and Lyft provide creates exciting
and new opportunities for workers. It seems critical to tread through the
legal uncertainty and define the employment relationship between
Uber/Lyft and the driver to protect drivers from employer exploitation.
The core test of an employment relationship under the Borello test is
“whether the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control
the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired.”122 The court
in O’Connor recognized that the Borello test “evolved under an economic
model very different from the new sharing economy.”123 Companies
employed workers to provide services for the companies’ own benefit.
117
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There was a traditional and more direct connection between the worker
and the business. Whether an individual was an independent contractor or
employee depended on how much control that business had over that
worker. However, the Uber and Lyft business models diverge from the
traditional forms of employment and present challenges to the application
of the Borello test.
The relationships Uber and Lyft maintain with drivers do not neatly
result in classification under the Borello test. Like an independent
contractor, drivers are given freedom to work for different employers; they
are not economically dependent on the ride-share services for their main
source of income. The drivers have flexibility in their work hours and
where they work.124 The drivers use their own cars for each ride.125
Drivers also control acceptance of rides, and therefore are in control of
their own opportunity for profit or loss.126 Contrastingly, like traditional
employees, the drivers are integral to the companies’ businesses. Uber
and Lyft maintain control over pricing of rides and payment.127 They
maintain control through rating systems.128 However, the form of control
the courts in both cases focused heavily on was that the rating system
differs from the control that exists in a traditional business model of a
company, such as FedEx. The drivers in the Uber case argued that it is
different because it does not seek to control every aspect of the worker’s
performance.129 Looking at the differences between the two business
models, the rating system in Uber and Lyft could be viewed as a form of
quality control based on customer feedback. Uber and Lyft seek to
continue or discontinue the engagement based on whether customers are
satisfied. The on-demand companies rely on customer feedback to ensure
quality performance. Under this system, the individuals receiving the
service—those being transported—have the ability to rate and provide
feedback. Once Uber or Lyft receive this feedback, the company responds
accordingly to maintain quality control over its business, without
controlling the workers’ performance in a traditional sense.
Uber and Lyft provide workers flexibility and freedom in some
important aspects of the work relationship yet maintain control in others.
This relationship falls into a gray area of employment classification.
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C. Creating a New Classification: A Hybrid Employee and Independent
Contractor
The court in Cotter correctly stated that “the jury in this case will be
handed a square peg and asked to choose between two round holes.”130
Nearly all workers in the United States fall into one of two categories:
employee or independent contractor. However, these categories seem
outdated and ill fit with the technological age of on-demand businesses
run through apps. In these businesses, where workers seem to cross the
border of independent contractor and employee, a third category seems
necessary. For example, courts and labor and employment statutes in
Canada and Germany recognize an intermediate class, called the
“dependent contractor.”131 This relationship forms when a contractor has
formed an exclusive relationship132 over a period of time with one client,
and the client therefore becomes economically dependent on the
relationship.133 While this new worker status that has developed
demonstrates the workability of new categories of work relationships, it
does not precisely illustrate the flexible relationships of the on-demand
economy. Society is still in need of a category that encompasses
employees who make a living working for different companies throughout
their careers, and sometimes working those jobs simultaneously.134
Seth Harris, a professor at Cornell University, and Alan Krueger a
professor at Princeton University, have proposed legal reform that could
provide a possible solution to the ambiguous classification of Uber and
Lyft drivers.135 Harris and Krueger propose a new classification of
workers, called the independent workers, who “occupy the gray area
between [traditional] employees and independent contractors.”136 In an
effort to define this new class, Harris and Krueger suggest ideas of what
protections and benefits these new workers would be provided. First,
Harris and Krueger argue that independent workers should be given the
freedom to organize and collectively bargain.137 They contend that these
workers should have the ability to bargain over the equivalent of wages,
130
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hours, and the terms and conditions of their contractual relationships.138
Harris and Krueger point out that the main challenge to independent
workers organizing is the federal anti-trust laws.139 They suggest an
independent workers’ exemption to anti-trust laws, which would allow the
workers to have a voice and some ability to influence their relationship.140
Harris and Krueger also advance that independent workers should be
included within the protections of federal anti-discrimination statutes.141
Providing independent workers with protections against discrimination
could encourage better policy enforcement by Uber and Lyft against racial
and sexual discrimination.142 Uber would have to administer a new policy
that not only takes into account the rating system of customers, who may
discriminate against drivers, causing driver terminations, but possibly also
co-worker perception.
Harris and Krueger also suggest allowing intermediary companies,
such as Uber and Lyft, to opt-in to workers’ compensation without
transforming the relationship into employment.143 However, Uber and
Lyft might be better off including workers’ compensation into their
business model.
Drivers would have a reasonably predictable
compensation for work related injuries, and Uber144 and Lyft145 could
avoid costly lawsuits.
These changes suggested by Harris and Krueger would help to
protect every Uber and Lyft driver; however, other protections they
138
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address may be better aimed at drivers who work for the company in a
more full-time capacity. For example, Harris and Krueger assert that
independent workers should not be eligible for wage and hour protections,
such as minimum wage, because it is too hard to measure the hours of a
flexible, independent worker compared to a traditional employee.146
While it is true that Uber and Lyft drivers work flexible and somewhat
unpredictable hours, every hour they work is clocked in and out through
the app. A better solution might be for Uber to pay minimum wage to
drivers who work over thirty hours per week. Uber pays drivers on a
weekly basis and uses the app to create a payment summary that shows the
breakdown of all rides. It would be easy to calculate hours and pay drivers
minimum wage just by requiring drivers to hit a thirty hour or more limit,
and then referring to the app to see when that driver worked.
Another option might be to allow customers to tip Uber and Lyft
drivers.147 The U.S. Department of Labor does not require employers to
pay minimum wage to a worker if the amount paid plus tips received
equals at least the federal minimum wage.148 Currently, Uber’s website
states that, “tips are not included in the fare, nor are they expected or
required.”149 Lyft’s website provides instructions of how to tip a driver,
but the reputation surrounding these platforms is that once the ride is over,
the fare automatically charged is the final cost.150 If both Uber and Lyft
promoted tipping drivers, this may change how riders view the experience.
Then, Uber and Lyft could avoid paying full minimum wage to drivers
who make it in tips and only make up the difference to those who do not.
Similarly, health insurance could be distributed to drivers who reach
the thirty-hour requirement. However, this presents a problem with
146 Seth D. Harris and Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for
Twenty-First-Century Work: “The Independent Worker”, in THE HAMILTON PROJECT, 20
(2015).
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http://ssrn.com/abstract=2725699 (there has been dispute about the social value of tipping.
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equally compensating. However, others have noted that tipping is a form of quality control,
noting customer satisfaction and encouraging improvement in job performance and
employee cooperation).
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maintaining neutrality of independent workers between the
employer/independent contractor classifications. Under the Affordable
Care Act, employers must provide health insurance to employees who
work thirty hours or more.151 Instead, Harris and Krueger propose that
intermediary companies pay a contribution equal to five percent out of
independent workers’ earnings to go towards health insurance tax
subsidies.152
A new classification for the on-demand workforce could clear up
ambiguities for courts that have previously attempted to pigeonhole these
workers into the employee/independent contractor category. However, it
is a lengthy conversation and one that would take years before
implementation. The courts cannot create this new category of workers
on their own, and, therefore, it will be left to the legislatures to provide a
workable solution. In the meantime, the ongoing lawsuits within the Ninth
Circuit probably will not force Uber and Lyft to change their business
models. Uber and Lyft are entirely constructed around their flexible
drivers and independent contractor model. The cases, as of now, are
limited to California drivers. These drivers are up against multi-million
dollar companies, so any damages they win will matter little in the general
scheme of things.153 However, if the lawsuits spread, both on-demand
companies and the legislature will need to consider a new solution to fit
the needs of a changing economy.
Uber and Lyft could potentially change their business models to
make the drivers employees. However, if the drivers were to become
employees they may lose the flexibility that attracts many of them to the
ride-share companies in the first place.154 As it stands, Uber and Lyft
drivers have control over when and how often they work. They are free to
work other full-time jobs and still drive for Uber whenever the opportunity
arises.155 As employees, the employer would control their schedules.156
The convenience that results to the driver from freedom to drive whenever
and however they like would be lost.157 Drivers who treat the job as a full151 E.g., Seth D. Harris and Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws
for Twenty-First-Century Work: “The Independent Worker”, in THE HAMILTON PROJECT,
7, 20 (2015).
152 Id.
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Third Of Its Latest Valuation Round, ZEROHEDGE (Aug. 21, 2016, 12:50PM),
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time job would benefit from this, but the many other drivers who do not
would suffer.158 Uber would likely compensate for rising labor costs by
taking a larger cut in fares and decreasing its workforce.159 As we address
possible solutions to the on-demand dichotomy and ways to better protect
worker interests, we must keep in mind that many workers are interested
in preserving the flexibility and freedom that first attracted them to Uber
and Lyft.
IV. CONCLUSION
The recent Uber and Lyft cases provide insight into the outdated
employment classification test in California in light of the changing
economy. However, on a broader scale it raises issues about what benefits
and protections workers are entitled to when they are not an employee or
independent contractor, but something in between. Ultimately, creating a
new category of workers could strengthen the on-demand workforce and
clear ambiguity among courts that have wrestled with these employment
relationships.
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